Center for Social Information Sciences (CSIS) Seminar
Baxter 127
Structural Rationality, Strategic Reasoning, and Equilibrium
Marciano Siniscalchi,
Professor of Economics,
Northwestern University,
Abstract: Structural rationality (Siniscalchi, ECMA 2022) requires players to account for the possibility of future surprises when choosing their current actions. This requirement strengthens the notion of (weak) sequential rationality introduced by Reny (ECMA, 1992). We investigate the implications of structural rationality for both equilibrium and non-equilibrium solution concepts. In particular, we draw a connection with quasi-perfection (Van Damme, IJGT 1984) and explore the interplay between forward-induction reasoning and structural rationality.
Joint work with Emiliano Catonini and Amanda Friedenberg.
For more information, please contact Letty Diaz by phone at 626-395-1255 or by email at letty.diaz@caltech.edu.